Articles

NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CONTINUITY OF THE CHOICE RULES

  • José C.R. Alcantud
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  • Facultad de Econom´?a y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca Campus Miguel de Unamuno E 37007 Salamanca, Spain

Received date: 2008-12-21

  Online published: 2011-07-20

Supported by

This research was supported by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´on under Research Project ECO2009-07682, and by Junta de Castilla y Le´on under the Research Project SA024A08 and GR-99 Funding.

Abstract

The proposal in Alcantud and Al´os-Ferrer [1], where players that express their tastes according to choice rules facing a competitive situation, is further exploited here. We prove that, under lack of continuity of the choice rules it is also possible to ensure the existence of equilibrium. We shall appeal to general situations that are fulfilled by well-established models, where players have non-transitive preferences of various types.

Cite this article

José C.R. Alcantud . NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CONTINUITY OF THE CHOICE RULES[J]. Acta mathematica scientia, Series B, 2011 , 31(4) : 1535 -1540 . DOI: 10.1016/S0252-9602(11)60339-1

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