Xian-jia WANG
,
Rui DONG
,
Lin CHEN
. THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA[J]. Acta mathematica scientia, Series B, 2018
, 38(1)
: 73
-92
.
DOI: 10.1016/S0252-9602(17)30118-2
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